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Abstract: I analyze the meaning of mass in Newtonian mechanics. First, I explain
the notion of primitive ontology, which was originally introduced in the philosophy
of quantum mechanics. Then I examine the two common interpretations of mass:
mass as a measure of the quantity of matter and mass as a dynamical property. I
claim that the former is ill-defined, and the latter is only plausible with respect to
a metaphysical interpretation of laws of nature. I explore the following options for
the status of laws: Humeanism, primitivism about laws, dispositionalism, and ontic
structural realism.
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1 Primitive Ontology
Any scientific theory must explicitly state what it is about. In particular, every funda-
mental physical theory must explain the aspect of the world to which its mathematical
formalism refers. Albert Einstein reminds us of this truism:
Any serious consideration of a physical theory must take into account the distinction
between the objective reality, which is independent of any theory, and the physical
concepts with which the theory operates. These concepts are intended to correspond
with the objective reality, and by means of these concepts we picture this reality
ourselves. (1935, p. 777)
This seemingly innocent quote contains a strong metaphysical claim and a non-trivial
epistemological assertion. On the one hand, Einstein presupposes a world existing in-
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dependently of any human being. There is an objective reality irrespective of the way we
perceive or make judgments about it. On the other hand, we can form physical theories
in order to account for the behavior of objects in the world. Physics, in particular, uses
mathematics as its central language. And here lies the challenge physics has to meet,
since the mathematical entities, like numbers or functions, do not refer to anything in
the world unless they are interpreted as doing so. An even greater problem arises when
the mathematical entities refer to objects that cannot be directly perceived by our sense
organs, for there is always a grain of doubt about their existence.
But physical theories, by means of mathematics, are all we have to explain and predict
the behavior of objects, such as electrons, tables, stars, and galaxies. And not all the
mathematical entities of a physical theory stand on an equal footing. First, the theory
has to postulate basic material entities that are supposed to be the constituents of all
the objects around us. Without this requirement, a physical theory is empty.
This requirement for any fundamental physical theory started to get lost in the for-
mation of quantum mechanics. As such, Einstein continued to call attention to it in his
philosophical writings. And more than half a century later, the mathematical physicists
Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì formed the notion of a primitive ontology (original paper
from 1992 reprinted in 2013, Chap. 2) to remind us that quantum mechanics has to
postulate certain basic objects in order to be a meaningful theory.
By definition, a primitive ontology consists of the fundamental building blocks of
matter in three-dimensional space. It cannot simply be inferred from the mathematical
formalism of the theory. Instead, it must be postulated as its referent. So all objects,
like tables and chairs, are constituted by the elements of the primitive ontology, and
the behavior of these elements determines the behavior of the objects. Maudlin (2015)
emphasizes that with the help of a primitive ontology, a physical theory establishes
a connection between theory and data. In particular, every measurement-outcome can
eventually be explained in terms of a primitive ontology, and the measurement apparatus
has no special status with respect to the measured system.
So what do the elements of a primitive ontology look like? This depends on the
physical theory we use. In quantum mechanics, for instance, there are three famous
options, which actually lead to three different theories and not only to three different
interpretations of the same theory: Bohmian mechanics presupposes a particle ontology;
GRWm, a continuous distribution of matter; and GRWf, flashes, that is, a discrete
distribution of events in space-time. As in the Bohmian case, the primitive ontology of
Newtonian mechanics consists only of particles.1 Particles are point-size objects sitting
on points of Newton’s absolute space. A point in space can either be occupied by a
particle, or it can stay empty. And therefore two or more particles cannot share the
same point in space at the same time.
In order to account for the behavior of the primitive ontology, a physical theory has
to introduce dynamical entities. The predominant dynamical elements of Newtonian
1I consider Newtonian mechanics an action-at-a-distance theory. Interpreting this theory as postulating
a gravitational field in addition to the particles would open Pandora’s box about the ontological status
of fields in general. A detailed treatment of classical fields is beyond the scope of this paper.
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mechanics are mass and forces. The standard story is that particles have mass, and in
virtue of having mass they exert certain forces between one another. Mass and forces
play a different role to particles. While particles constitute all physical objects, mass
and forces constrain the motion of the particles.
In this paper, I focus on the ontological role of mass—forces will be treated only in
so far as they elucidate the role of mass. There are two standard ways to interpret
the ontological status of mass: it can be the measure of the quantity of matter or an
intrinsic property of particles. I argue in the next section that the quantity of matter
has to be defined in a different way. In Section 3, I explain that the status of properties
depends on the metaphysics of laws of nature. There are three predominant positions:
Humeanism, primitivism about laws, and dispositionalism. In each theory mass plays a
different ontological role.
2 Mass and Quantity of Matter
Newton starts his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy with a definition of
the quantity of matter:
Definition 1
Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and volume
jointly.
If the density of air is doubled in a space that is also doubled, there is four times
as much air, and there is six times as much if the space is tripled. The case is
the same for snow and powders condensed by compression or liquefaction, and also
for all bodies that are condensed in various ways by any causes whatsoever. [. . . ]
Furthermore, I mean this quantity whenever I use the term “body” or “mass” in
the following pages. It can always be known from a body’s weight, for—by making
very accurate experiments with pendulum—I have found it to be proportional to
the weight, as will be shown below. (1999, pp. 403–404)
If mass is defined as density times volume, then the notion of mass has no physical
content or explanatory value, since the density itself is defined as mass per volume.
Ernst Mach harshly criticizes Newton’s definition on this point:
Definition 1 is, as has already been set forth a pseudo-definition. The concept of
mass is not made clearer by describing mass as the product of the volume into
density as density itself denotes simply the mass of unit volume. The true definition
of mass can be deduced only from the dynamical relations of bodies. (1919, p. 241)
Newton does not give a definition of density; nor is density examined in the scholium
following the definitions. It seems that Newton assumes that the reader has a pre-
knowledge or an intuition about density such that Definition 1 is more of a rule showing
how mass, volume, and density are related rather than a logical definition. As Mach
correctly states, a definition of mass in the above sense does not work, which leads to
the following two questions:
1. What does “quantity of matter” mean?
3
2. Is mass connected to the quantity of matter?
Concerning the first question, a primitive ontology of particles allows us to count the
particles in a certain volume, and it is natural to take this as the definition of quantity
of matter without getting into any redundancy. For instance, the quantity of matter of
a table consists then of the number of particles, which form the table.
Since the particles themselves have no internal structure, it does not make sense to
assign a quantity of matter to each. At least, it is not meaningful to assign different
quantities of matter to particles so that a particle A carries a quantity of matter a, and
particle B carries a quantity of matter b, with a 6= b.
Besides, physics in general and Newtonian mechanics in particular do not need a
separate or independent notion of quantity of matter in order to be applied to the world.
Statistical mechanics, which relies on counting the number of particles, does not run into
conceptual or empirical problems despite lacking an additional notion of the quantity
of matter. So it is more precise and parsimonious to define quantity of matter by the
number of particles.
Concerning the second question, Newton himself confesses in the last sentence of the
quote above that we only have epistemic access to mass when weighing an object, and
from the weight we can deduce the quantity of matter. Mach goes a step further, stating
that “[t]he true definition of mass can be deduced only from the dynamical relations
of bodies.” In this regard, mass is not related to the quantity of matter of an object.
Instead, its true and only meaning is dynamical.
3 Mass as a Dynamical Property
The dynamical role of mass is captured in Newton’s first and second law of motion.
Law 1
Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight
forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.
Law 2
A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place
along the straight line in which that force is impressed. (1999, p. 416)
The first law states that the natural motion of a particle is inertial motion, that is, either
staying at rest or moving with constant velocity in a straight line. The only thing that
can change this motion is the influence of external forces. The second law then shows
exactly how the forces act on the particle: first, the stronger the force the greater the
acceleration, and, second, the acceleration is parallel to the external force.
Newton’s second law is nowadays mathematically formulated as a differential equation.
ConsiderN particles P1, . . . , PN at positions q1 . . . , qN ; their trajectories q1(t), . . . , qN (t)
fulfill the differential equation
F i (q1(t), . . . , qN (t), q˙1(t), . . . , q˙N (t), t) = miq¨i(t), (1)
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where F i is the force on the i-th particle, q˙i its velocity, q¨i its acceleration, and mi its
inertial mass. Clearly, the above differential equation makes precise what Newton put
into words. And it includes the content of his first law, too: the absence of forces results
in inertial motion. So there is actually only one law of motion that generates all classical
trajectories of particles, namely, the above differential equation (1).
Still, the law of motion is not complete. We need a precise formulation of the forces
involved. On the fundamental level, one important force is gravitation:
F i (q1, . . . , qN ) =
∑
j 6=i
Gmimj
qj − qi∥∥∥qj − qi∥∥∥3 (2)
with the gravitational constant G and the gravitational massesmi andmj of the particles
Pi and Pj respectively. The inertial and gravitational masses are a priori physically
distinct quantities: the former is a feature of all particles and must be considered in all
kinds of interactions; the latter is a specific quantity as part of the law of gravitation (2).
It is an empirical fact that inertial mass equals gravitational mass, and, therefore, we
can treat them as one quantity. Note also that in Newton’s theory there are no massless
particles, because equation (1) breaks down if we insert m = 0. So mass is an essential
feature of particles in Newtonian mechanics.
Construed as a dynamical property, there are three ways in which physics describes
mass:
1. mass is an intrinsic property of particles;
2. mass is just a parameter of the laws of motion;
3. mass is a coupling constant.
I claim that these three interpretations can only be made precise with respect to some
metaphysical framework. In what follows, we discuss mass in the framework of Humean-
ism, primitivism about laws, and dispositionalism. Finally I interpret mass within the
theory of ontic structural realism, which I regard as an instance of dispositionalism.
Humean Supervenience
Humean supervenience, the modern form of Hume’s metaphysics, was first posited by
David Lewis:
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters
of fact, just one little thing and then another. [. . . ] We have geometry: a system
of external relations of spatiotemporal distance between points. Maybe points of
spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether fields, maybe both. And
at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which
need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have
an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. All else supervenes on that. (1986, pp.
ix–x)
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The ontology of Humean supervenience is characterized by the contingent distribution
of local matters of particular facts: the Humean mosaic. There is a net of spatiotempo-
ral points that are connected only by external metrical relations, and, at those points,
certain qualities can be instantiated by at least one of three entities that Lewis regards
as fundamental: space-time itself, particles, or values of fields. Given some initial dis-
tribution of those qualities there is nothing in the ontology that constrains its further
development.
Obviously, our world contains regularities, but on the Humean view this is just a
contingent fact. In order to avoid giving an enormously long list of particular facts
describing these regularities, Lewis (1994, p. 478) introduces his best system account of
laws of nature. According to his proposal, the laws of nature are theorems of the best
deductive system, which combines or balances simplicity and strength in describing the
temporal development of local matters of particular facts throughout space and time. A
long list of these facts would be highly informative but very complex, whereas a single
law of nature would be very simple but probably not contain enough information. So
the best system comprises a certain finite number of laws of nature as theorems, which
offer the perfect compromise.
In Lewis’s Humeanism, mass can be part of the ontology of the mosaic: in which
case it is a “natural intrinsic property” instantiated at points of space-time. This move,
however, poses a serious metaphysical problem: mass becomes a categorical property
that is defined as independent of the causal role it plays in the world. Hence, mass
has a primitive identity or quiddity, which allows it to play a different causal role in
another possible world. For example, in another possible world mass could play the role
of charge. This would be the very same property that we call mass, but it would act like
charge does in our world.
This seems absurd and leads to the problem—called humility—of our not having
epistemic access to the true identity of mass, because all we can know are the causal
consequences of properties. So, given two worlds that coincide in the temporal devel-
opment of all their particles, it would, first, be metaphysically possible for these worlds
to be different with respect to the quiddity of their categorical properties, and, second,
it would be impossible for us to know which world we inhabited. Lewis bites the bul-
let and accepts this metaphysical burden in favor of a sparse ontology with no modal
connections.
Ned Hall (2009, Sec. 5.2) proposes a different strategy for conceptualizing the status
of mass. He interprets the Humean mosaic as consisting solely of point-sized particles
standing in certain spatiotemporal relations (see also Loewer, 1996; Esfeld, 2014). The
particles do not have intrinsic properties, let alone categorical ones, and all non-modal
facts about the world are just the positions of these particles. Mass enters the scene as
part of the best system describing the temporal development of the particles, as part
of the fundamental laws of nature in the Humean sense, and as part of the differential
equations that describe the trajectories of particles. In a description of the history of
the world that balances simplicity and informativeness, mass functions as a parameter
in this best system.
For Newtonian mechanics, restricted to gravitational interaction, the best system may
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be interpreted as consisting of the equations (1) and (2). As a way of speaking or as a
convenient metaphor, we can ascribe these parameters to the particles themselves such
that every particle Pi is characterized by a magnitude mi. But this interpretation of
mass does not change or add anything to the ontology. The distribution of propertyless
particles is the entire ontology; everything else, including mass, supervenes on this mo-
saic. As such, there are no categorical properties in the ontology, and the problem of
quiddity or humility does not arise in this version of Humean supervenience.
One general critique attacks Humean supervenience on a point that Humeans regard
as one of its greatest virtues: the sparse ontology that lacks modal connections. It is
unsatisfactory that there are no facts about why we see regularities in our world. Even
the laws of nature as part of the best system cannot explain why particles follow a
Newtonian trajectory. For particles just move as they do, in a contingent way. All a
Humean can do is give a good description or summary of the regularities, and if the
regularities change she has to change her description too. Consequently, we have to
include modal connections in the ontology.
Primitivism about Laws
Primitivism about laws regards the existence of the laws of nature as a primitive fact,
where the laws themselves govern the behavior of the primitive ontology. One famous
adherent of this position is Tim Maudlin:
To the ontological question of what makes a regularity into a law of nature I answer
that lawhood is a primitive status. Nothing further, neither relations among univer-
sals nor role in a theory, promotes a regularity into a law. [. . . ] My analysis of laws
is no analysis at all. Rather I suggest we accept laws as fundamental entities in our
ontology. Or, speaking at the conceptual level, the notion of a law cannot be re-
duced to other more primitive notions. The only hope of justifying this approach is
to show that having accepted laws as building blocks we can explain how our beliefs
about laws determine our beliefs in other domains. Such results come in profusion.
(2007, pp. 17–18)
As stated by Maudlin, the entire ontology is made up of the primitive ontology plus the
laws of nature. It is a primitive fact that there are laws of nature, and that particles
move according to these laws. The task of physics, then, is to discover these laws. For
instance, it is a primitive fact that equations (1) and (2) hold in a Newtonian universe,
and here we come to an answer regarding why a particle follows a Newtonian trajectory:
because there are such laws.
What is the role of mass in this framework, then? It is just a parameter of the
Newtonian laws of motion referring to nothing at all in the primitive ontology. Mass is
not a parameter that results from the best description, as in the Humean case; rather it
is an essential parameter of the laws of nature leading to correct trajectories.
The notion of a parameter is slightly inappropriate here, because it invites us to think
about mass as being adjusted or altered under certain circumstances. But the only
circumstance available to us is the universe as a whole. There is a primitive ontology
consisting of N particles and the laws of nature. And it happens to be the case that the
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law is formulated such that there are N constants m1, . . . ,mN . So it seems more ap-
propriate to interpret m1, . . . ,mN as constants of nature on a par with the gravitational
constant G or Planck’s constant h¯. Recognizing masses as constants of nature is clearer
and more in the spirit of primitivism than dubbing them parameters. It is likely that
the idea of mass as a parameter came from the application of Newton’s laws to real life
cases, where it had to be adjusted to describe the physical bodies of a given subsystem.
Similarly to Hall, one can pretend that the parameter mass is “located” at the particle’s
position and speak as if it were an intrinsic property of particles. In this sense mass still
has a purely nomological role, but this way of speaking may aid our intuition.
Primitivism about laws retrieves modal connections as part of ontology in the form of
laws. Maudlin does not state how laws are connected to the primitive ontology. There
seems to be an intuition that laws “govern” or “direct” the behavior of particles, but
these phrases are purely metaphorical (Loewer, 1996, p. 119). In the above quote, there
is no attempt to explain these metaphors: “lawhood is a primitive status.” Nevertheless,
one can ask, “How can a law as an abstract entity govern anything in the world? How
can particles or any material body ‘obey’ these laws?” Primitivism about laws just
answers, “It is a primitive fact.” Nonetheless, one position that tries to answer these
questions by introducing an underlying mechanism is dispositionalism.
Dispositionalism
This strategy tries to recover modal connections by introducing dynamical properties
into physical systems, which are called dispositions or powers (for instance, Bird, 2007).
Accordingly, a physical system behaves the way it does because it has a certain property
or disposition to do so. This idea can be applied to the primitive ontology of Newtonian
mechanics. Mass is then an intrinsic property of particles. It is intrinsic in the sense
that the mass of one particle does not depend on the masses of other particles.
Mass, interpreted as a disposition, does not give an intrinsic identity to particles.
The identity of particles stems from their location in space. Since Newtonian mechanics
relies on an absolute background space, where every point in space is by definition
distinguished from any other point in space, it is sufficient to ground the identity of
particles on their position in absolute space.2 The role of mass is solely a dynamical one;
that is to say, it constrains the motion of particles.
Moreover, it is essential for mass to have the same causal-nomological role in all
possible worlds; it is not a categorical property, and consequently it does not bear the
problems of either quiddity or humility. This causal-nomological role is expressed by
Newton’s laws (1) and (2). In other words, Newton’s laws are grounded in the ontology
by the intrinsic masses of particles. Our epistemic access to mass as a disposition is
possible through observation of what it does in the world, that is, its causal-nomological
role; and the laws of nature (1) and (2) are a concise expression of its effects.
A crucial feature of dispositions is their need for certain triggering conditions in order
to be manifested in the world. Zooming into Newton’s second law (1) we can see the
2As argued in Esfeld et al. (2015), this can be already done in a relational space.
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following: the manifestation of the mass mj of particle Pj at time t is its acceleration
aj(t) given the positions and velocities of all the particles (including Pj) at time t. So
the positions and velocities of all particles are triggering conditions for the manifestation
of mass. In the case of gravitation, the mass mj cancels out on both sides of (1), and we
deduce that the acceleration aj(t) does not mathematically depend on mj . Yet, aj(t) is
the manifestation of the mass of the j-th particle, though it is independent of the precise
value of mj .
Ontic Structural Realism
The interpretation of mass as a coupling constant does not seem to fit either of the
metaphysical schemes discussed above. What is the ontological status of mass distinct
from its being an intrinsic property of particles or a constant in the laws of motion?
Mass, interpreted as a coupling constant, emphasizes the dynamical relations between
particles. Particles move as they do because they stand in certain relations described by
Newton’s laws (1) and (2), and the role of mass is then to quantify these relations.
A metaphysical approach that supports this view is ontic structural realism (OSR).
According to the original idea of OSR, the world consists purely of structures, all the
way down to the fundamental level (Ladyman and Ross, 2007; French, 2014). If there
happen to be physical objects in the ontology, they are interpreted as nodes of structures.
And this is the weak point of OSR, because the existence of structures without objects
to instantiate them is implausible. Esfeld (2009) therefore suggests that OSR requires
objects as the relata of structures, and he interprets the structures as being modal. That
is to say, they constrain the temporal development of the objects instantiating them.
Esfeld’s proposal qualifies OSR as an instance of dispositionalism. The only difference
lies in the nature of the dynamical entities. Intrinsic properties are no longer respon-
sible for the dynamical constraints; this task is fulfilled solely by relations between the
elements of the primitive ontology.
It is now straightforward to apply this idea to Newtonian mechanics. Particles are the
objects that stand in certain spatiotemporal relations resulting from their positions in
absolute space, and in addition to these spatiotemporal relations they stand in certain
dynamical relations. The latter relations are the modal structure. In the case of gravi-
tation, this structure functions according to (2), and the manifestation of this structure
is the acceleration of particles according to (1). Note that the spatial relations between
the particles are not modal, because these relations alone have no causal-nomological
role in the dynamical behavior of particles.
So mass cannot be interpreted as an intrinsic property of particles in this framework;
rather, it is a parameter that specifies the gravitational structure regarded as an additive
bipartite particle–particle relation according to (2), and, in this sense, the particles are
coupled. In other words, the motion of one particle changes the motion of other particles
in the universe because taken together particles instantiate a dynamical structure. A
crucial feature of this dynamical structure is that it is reducible to or separable into
direct relations between two particles; this reduction fails in the quantum case, which
requires a non-separable holistic structure as proposed by Esfeld et al. (2014). In sum,
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the notion of a coupling constant points to two aspects of mass: on the one hand, mass
is a constant in the laws of motion, and, on the other hand, this notion anticipates
dynamical relations between particles.
4 Conclusion
The aims of this paper were twofold. First, I showed that the notion of a primitive
ontology can be fruitfully used in classical mechanics. Second, I argued that the status
of mass depends on the metaphysics of the laws of nature. It subsequently became clear
that mass has to be interpreted as a dynamical entity introduced by Newton’s laws of
motion. The metaphysical theories that I discussed allow mass to be construed in three
different ways: it may be regarded as a parameter, as an intrinsic property, or as a
coupling constant. I tried to remain neutral with respect to the “best” interpretation.
A thorough evaluation of the different positions remains to be undertaken.
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